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The E.U. Model as an Adoptable Approach
for U.S. Privacy Laws: A Comparative
Analysis of Data Collection Laws in the
United Kingdom, Germany, and
the United States
LAURA YBARRA∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In a statement evoking Orwellian images, former Google CEO
Eric Schmidt spoke about the possibility of his company improving its
search engine: “We don’t need you to type at all. We know where you
are. We know where you’ve been. We can more or less know what
you’re thinking about.”1 In a later television appearance on CNN, the
former CEO did little to assuage privacy concerns over Google’s Street
View map, a service that provides panoramic views from various
positions along many streets in the world, when he said: “We drive
exactly once. So you can just move, right?”2 Schmidt’s comments
underscore not only the pervasiveness of technology but also its
implications on an individual’s privacy in a technological age. It is this
unanticipated ubiquity of technology that has Europeans and Americans
alike confronted with the functionality of privacy laws in an age of data
collection.
In 2009, Germany passed amendments to the country’s Federal

∗ J.D., Loyola Law School, 2012; B.A., University of Southern California, 2008. My deepest
thanks are reserved for my parents for their love and support, and Philip for all his
encouragement.
1. Catharine Smith, Google CEO Eric Schmidt’s Most Controversial Quotes About
Privacy, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/04/googleceo-eric-schmidt-privacy_n_776924.html#s170420.
2. Wilson Rothman, Don’t Like Google Street View? Just Move, Says CEO, TECHNOLOG
ON
NBCNEWS.COM
TECH
(Oct.
25,
2010),
http://www.technolog.msnbc.msn.com/technology/technolog/dont-google-street-view-just-movesays-ceo-126480.
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Data Protection Act.3 These amendments covered a broad range of data
collection issues including a requirement of notification of data security
breaches4 and changes in data marketing rules.5 The 2009 amendments
also called for increased fines for violations of the law,6 and expanded
the powers of the supervisory authority.7
Germany has sparred with American technology companies Apple,
Facebook, and Google. The country has launched investigations into
how these companies collect and store personal data.8 For instance,
German officials asked Google to turn over data from home wireless
networks that were collected while the company compiled information
for its Street View map.9 German data-protection officials launched
legal proceedings in August 2010 because of how Facebook handles
non-user information.10 German officials questioned Apple about the
duration and the type of personal information the company stores on its
iPhone 4.11
By contrast, U.K. laws take a more hands-off approach to privacy
laws compared to their German counterparts. A 2009 European
Commission Union (E.C.) report admonished the United Kingdom
(U.K.) about its privacy laws.12 The E.C. report concluded that the U.K.
violated European Union (E.U.) rules by failing to adequately protect its
citizens’ personal data.13 The E.C. cited the lack of an independent
national authority to supervise interception of communications,14 and
further urged the government to enact laws that ensured safeguards in
3. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Jan. 1, 2002, BGBL. I,
last amended by Gesetz [G], Sept. 1, 2009, BGBL. I (Ger.).
4. Id. § 42(a), § 33.
5. Id. § 30(a), § 28(a), § 32.
6. Id. § 43.
7. Id. § 23, § 38.
8. Google-Street-View Tours Also Used for Scanning WLAN-Networks, FED.
COMMISSIONER FOR DATA PROTECTION & FREEDOM INFO. (Apr. 23, 2010),
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/PublicRelations/PressReleases/2010/GoogleWLANScan.html?nn=4
10214 [hereinafter Commissioner’s Press Release]. See also Kevin O’Brien, Despite Privacy
Inquiries, Germans Flock to Google, Facebook and Apple, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2010, at B8.
9. Commissioner’s Press Release, supra note 8; see also Kevin O’Brien, Google Balks at
Turning Over Data to Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at B3.
10. Christopher Lawton & Vanessa Fuhrmans, Google Rouses Privacy Concerns in
Germany—Mapping Service Sparks Debate as Nation Scarred by Authoritarian Past Grapples
With Personal Data in Digital Age, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2010, at B5.
11. Id.
12. Press Release, European Union, Telecoms: Commission Steps Up UK Legal Action over
Privacy
and
Personal
Data
Protection,
(Oct.
29,
2009),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1626.
13. Id.
14. Id.

2011]

Data Collection Laws

269

compliance with E.U. laws.15
The U.K.’s approach to handling data breaches has differed
notably from that of Germany. For instance, as Google gathered data for
its Street View map and collected personal information from wireless
Internet networks, including passwords and e-mail messages, the
company avoided fines in the U.K. merely by promising to take steps to
avoid any repetition of what Google described as “inadvertent”
incidents.16 The company also agreed to delete the data it collected and
provide training for its employees on privacy issues.17
Although the United Kingdom and Germany have taken different
approaches to regulating privacy, more and more of their citizens are
joining Facebook, searching on Google, and using Apple products.18
These differences reveal a growing rift between E.U. laws and
consumer behavior in a technological society.19 This split has
confronted European countries with a quandary of how to draft
legislation that reconciles the competing interests of data protection
laws, technology companies’ desire to enter the European market, and
consumer attitudes towards individual privacy in a culture where
technology and social media are ubiquitous.20
The United States government is also struggling to adopt stricter
data collection privacy laws at the urging of consumer advocates. A
draft Internet privacy law was released to the public in May 2010 by
Representatives Rick Boucher and Cliff Stearns, members of the House
of Representative’s Subcommittee on Communications, Technology
and the Internet.21 The draft bill called for privacy notices to be clearly
marked on websites and for these notices to include how the
information is stored.22 The proposed bill made distinctions between
data that could be used only with the user’s consent and data that could
be used until the user opted-out.23 The bill was met with criticism from
advertising lobbyists and consumer advocates alike.24
15. Id.
16. Eric Pfanner, British Agency Says Google Violated Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/technology/04google.html.
17. Id.
18. O’Brien, supra note 8.
19. Id.
20. See e.g., Christopher Lawton, Google Street View Sparks New German Privacy Code,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2010, at B4.
21. H.R., 111TH CONG. (Discussion Draft May 3, 2010) [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
22. Id. at 9.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Diane Bartz, John McCain, John Kerry Introduce Contentious U.S. Privacy Bill,
REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/12/us-congress-privacy-
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Like Europe, the United States has taken varying approaches to
data collection issues. For example, it was reported in October 2010 that
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was dropping its investigation of
the information Google had obtained during preparation for the launch
of its Street View mapping service.25 The investigation ended with
Google agreeing to improve its data collection process and provide
privacy training for its employees.26 Nevertheless, Congress took notice
after the Wall Street Journal reported in October 2010 that Facebook
applications, or “apps,” were passing on private user information to
advertisers.27 Congressmen Joe Barton and Edward Markey, cochairmen of the House’s Bipartisan Privacy Caucus, sent a letter to
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg asking for more details about how the
company’s applications handle personal data.28 After receiving a
response from Marne Levine, Vice President of Global Public Policy for
Facebook,29 the Congressmen said they wanted to take up the topic
when Congress resumed its 2011 session.30
This Note will explore whether the European Union’s privacy laws
could serve as a model for the United States. Currently, U.S. data
collection laws are regulated by a patchwork system of state and federal
laws and agencies.31 The E.U.’s 1995 Directive on Data Protection, on
the other hand, mandated that each E.U. nation pass national privacy
laws and called for the creation of a Data Protection Authority to protect
idUSTRE73B59E20110412.
25. Grant Gross, FTC Closes Investigation into Google’s Wi-Fi Snooping, TECHWORLD,
(Oct.
28,
2010),
http://www.techworld.com.au/article/365929/ftc_closes_investigation_into_google_wifi_snooping/?fp=4&fpid=16.
26. John D. Sutter, FTC Ends Google ‘Street View’ Investigation Without Fines, CNN (Oct.
27,
2010,
1:59
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/web/10/27/ftc.google.investigation/index.html?eref=rss_tech&
utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_tech+(RSS
%3A+Technology).
27. Emily Steel & Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook in Privacy Breach, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18,
2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304772804575558484075236968.html;
see also Letter from Marne Levine, Vice President, Global Public Policy at Facebook, to Edward
Markey, Congressman, and Joe Barton, Congressman, Bi-Partisan Privacy Caucus (Oct. 29,
2010)
[hereinafter
Letter
from
Marne
Levine],
available
at
http://Republicans.EnergyCommerce.house.gov/Media/file/Letters/102910_Facebook_Response_
Barton_Markey.pdf.
28. Letter from Marne Levine, supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. Facebook Responds to Barton, Markey, HOUSE ENERGY & COM. COMMITTEE (Nov. 3,
2010), http://republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/news/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=8085.
31. Ken D. Kumayama, A Right to Pseudonymity, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 434 (2009); see,
e.g., The Online Privacy Protection Act (OPPA) of 2003, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575-22579
(2004), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 201.
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citizens’ privacy.32 The E.U. model allows for variation of data
collection laws by allowing its member countries to determine their own
laws.33 It is this degree of latitude, however, that has resulted in a
disharmony of laws within the European Union.34
Part II of this note begins with an overview of current data
collection privacy laws in the United States and further analyzes the
May 2010 Congressional Internet privacy draft bill. Part III traces E.U.
data collection privacy laws and the diverging standards that have
emerged in the United Kingdom and Germany. Part IV provides the
comparative analysis of data collection privacy laws in the United
States and the European Union. This section analyzes the strengths and
limitations of the proposed bill, and analyzes which features from the
E.U. model would best serve federal legislation in the United States.
Finally, Part V concludes that while the E.U. model provides an
umbrella legislative system that would improve the patchwork system
of current U.S. data collection privacy laws, the United States should
strengthen FTC enforcement powers and preempt state laws to avoid the
disharmony of the E.U. system.
II. BACKGROUND OF U.S. LAW
A. A Patchwork System of Data Collection Standards
The United States Supreme Court recognized the fundamental
right to privacy in the seminal 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut.35
There, the Court found that the Bill of Rights provided penumbras of
privacy as it struck down a law that forbade the use of contraceptives.36
Scholars have argued that privacy in the United States is based upon the
value of liberty.37 The notion of privacy as a liberty interest has been
32. Council Directive 95/46, arts. 27–28, Oct. 12, 1995, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC) [hereinafter
Council
Directive
95/46],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1995L0046:20031120:EN:PDF.
33. See, e.g., Commission Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy
Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments, A.4—Germany, final
(June
2010)
[hereinafter
A.4—Germany],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_cou
ntry_report_A4_germany.pdf.
34. Compare Commission Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy
Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments: A.6—United
Kingdom, EUR. COMM’N (June 2010) [hereinafter A.6—United Kingdom], available
at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/
final_report_country_report_A6_united_kingdom.pdf, with A.4—Germany, supra note 33.
35. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36. Id. at 483 (discussing penumbras within the Bill of Rights that create zones of privacy).
37. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
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exhibited in the Court’s treatment of several contentious social issues
such as abortion38 and homosexuality.39 Furthermore, case law in the
United States has recognized the right of privacy free from
governmental intrusion.40 While decisional privacy has been protected,
informational privacy has yet to receive such broad protection from the
Supreme Court.41 Instead, informational privacy has become rooted in
statutory law, common law, agency regulations, and self-regulatory
principles.42
1. Ineffective FTC Regulation of Online Privacy
Congress formed the FTC in 191443 in an effort to stop unfair
methods of competition in commerce.44 With its creation, Congress
granted the FTC a large degree of power.45 Since 1938, the FTC has
been empowered to prevent corporations from using “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” under Section 45
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.46 Courts have treated the FTC’s
decisions with deference, thus allowing the FTC to possess quasilegislative power to enact regulations.47
Today, the FTC is the leading regulating authority of online
privacy issues in the United States.48 However, the FTC has placed
limitations upon its own regulatory power. On the issue of online
privacy, for example, the FTC noted that it “lacks authority to require
firms to adopt information practice policies or to abide by the fair
information practice principles on their Web sites, or portions of their
Web sites, not directed to children.”49 Recently, the FTC conceded that
YALE L.J. 1153, 1161 (2004).
38. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
40. Kumayama, supra note 31, at 435–36.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 434–35. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
43. About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Jan 5, 2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2000), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2000-title15/pdf/USCODE-2000-title15-chap2subchapI.pdf.
47. Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1321 (2001).
48. Michael D. Scott, The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach
Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 128 (2008).
49. Sovern, supra note 47, at 1324. See Twitter Settles Charges That It Failed to Protect
Consumers’ Personal Information; Company Will Establish Independently Audited Information
Security
Program,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION,
(June
24,
2011),
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more regulation of online privacy was needed and suggested a universal
“Do Not Track” mechanism as a guard for online privacy.50 The FTC,
however, argued that Congress should provide such regulation.51
The FTC does, however, bring complaints against companies that
violate their published privacy policies.52 David Vladeck, the director of
the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, affirmed that promise in a
2010 statement: “When a company promises consumers that their
personal information is secure, it must live up to that promise.”53 In
2010, the FTC brought its first data security case against a social
network.54 In that suit, the FTC alleged that Twitter failed “to provide
reasonable and appropriate security to prevent unauthorized access to
nonpublic user information and honor the privacy choices exercised by
its users.”55 The breach resulted in two incidents where intruders were
able to reset account passwords.56 In one instance, the intruder tweeted
from then-presidential candidate Barack Obama’s account, offering his
followers a chance to win $500 in gasoline.57 In an agreement with the
FTC, Twitter agreed to strengthen its non-public consumer information
and further agreed to third-party assessments of its privacy procedures.58
In March 2011, Google agreed to settle charges that it violated its
own privacy promises to consumers with its launch of Google Buzz.59
Google agreed to implement a “comprehensive privacy program” and
agreed to privacy audits for twenty years.60 Yet the fact that the FTC has
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/twitter.shtm.
50. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 4–5 (2012). available at
http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf.
51. Sovern, supra note 47, at 1325.
52. Scott, supra note 48, at 129.
53. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Twitter Settles Charges That It Failed to
Protect Consumers’ Personal Information; Company Will Establish Independently Audited
Information
Security
Program
(June
24,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/twitter.shtm.
54. Complaint, Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162 (2011) [hereinafter Twitter Complaint].
55. Id. ¶ 11.
56. Id. ¶ 12(a).
57. Id.
58. Agreement, Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162 (2011) [hereinafter Twitter Agreement].
59. Agreement Containing Consent Order, In the Matter of Google Inc., File No. 102 3136,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/110330googlebuzzagreeorder.pdf [hereinafter Google
Agreement]. The FTC complaint alleged that Google users were not adequately informed that the
default setting allowed frequent contacts to be public. Complaint, Google, Inc., File No. 102 3136
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/110330googlebuzzcmpt.pdf. See also
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Charges Deceptive Privacy Practices in Google's
Rollout
of
Its
Buzz
Social
Network
(Mar.
30,
2011),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/03/google.shtm [hereinafter FTC Press Release].
60. Google Agreement, supra note 59, at 4–5.
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only brought a limited number of cases against social networking sites
is indicative of the agency’s hesitance to provide stronger regulation of
data collection practices.61
2. Sporadic state regulation of privacy rights
States have provided constitutional privacy rights, but these rights
have not been focused on informational privacy.62 Because of the
federal and state governments’ sporadic regulation of informational
privacy, only serious invasions of privacy interests have been
recognized.63 Informational privacy issues are generally analyzed under
common law privacy torts.64 Under common law, an invasion of privacy
cause of action could be brought under: (1) the placement of someone
in a false light; (2) the public disclosure of private facts; (3) the
intrusion upon a person’s seclusion or solitude; or (4) appropriation of a
person’s name or likeness.65 This approach has caused scholars to
debate whether informational privacy should extend so far as to fit
within one of these causes of action.66
The case law within the United States suggests, however, that
courts have not extended informational privacy protection within the
invasion of privacy tort.67 New Jersey, for example, recognized an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet service
provider (ISP) records in the 2008 case State v. Reid.68 There, however,
the court focused on the notion of privacy when the government was the
actor.69 It is likely that a different result would have been reached had
the actor been a private entity.
Indeed, a Pennsylvania court reached a different decision where
the actor was a private entity. In Boring v. Google, Inc., the court held
that images of the plaintiff’s house from Google’s Street View did not
rise to the level of invasion of privacy or intrusion upon seclusion.70
There, the court reasoned that the photographs were less intrusive than a
knock on the front door, and thus concluded that the plaintiffs did not
suffer a substantial injury.71 In December 2010, however, Google paid
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Sovern, supra note 47, at 1321.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386–88 (1960).
See Twitter Complaint, supra note 54, ¶ 11; State v. Reid, 945 A.2d 26, 33 (N.J. 2008).
Prosser, supra note 62, at 389.
Id.
Sovern, supra note 47, at 1317–18.
See Boring v. Google Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2010).
See Reid, supra note 63 at 28.
Id.
See Boring, supra note 67 at 280.
Id. at 279.
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the plaintiffs one dollar in nominal damages when the company entered
a consent judgment for trespassing.72 This judgment prevented higher
courts from further analyzing the issue of privacy.
Because of the limitations of recovery for plaintiffs under the
common law system, many states have enacted legislation to provide its
citizens with far greater informational privacy protection.73 These laws,
however, have focused too narrowly upon particular issues to provide
any cohesiveness for a set of uniform informational privacy laws in the
United States. For instance, in California, credit card companies are
required to notify the consumer about the privacy policy and,
furthermore, the consumers are given an option to opt-out.74 This is
similar to a Virginia statute that prohibits, in certain limited
circumstances, the information gathered “solely as the result of any
customer payment . . . by credit card” unless the merchant gives notice
to the consumer.75 Along the same vein, a number of states have enacted
“Do Not Call” lists that ban telemarketers.76 Some states have also
turned their attention to spam e-mail messages. For example, Tennessee
requires subject headings to be designated with “ADV,” or an
advertising label.77 These diverse measures, however, exemplify the
discontinuity of informational privacy laws enacted by states; instead of
providing citizens with blanket legislation that provides protection of
data collection practices, states focused on singular practices.
B. Proposed Bill: Stronger Federal Regulations, But Lack
of Consistent Standards
In an attempt to provide cohesive data collection laws that protect
informational privacy, federal legislators have proposed legislation that
would provide blanket regulation of data collection. It should be noted
that federal legislation is beneficial because it can provide clear
standards, align with consumer behaviors, and allow for amendments
more quickly than case law.78 In May 2010, Representatives Rich
72. Defendant Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Stay Pending Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (No. 08-cv-694), available at
http://www.zegarelli.com/Cases/Borings%20v%20Google/Google%20Response%20to%20Motio
n%20web.pdf (consent judgment).
73. See Sovern, supra note 47, at 1312–15. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-442 (1998),
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.12(b) (West 1998).
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1748.12(b) (West 1998); see Sovern, supra note 47, at 1315.
75. Sovern, supra note 47, at 1315; VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-442 (1998).
76. Sovern, supra note 47, at 1315. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.50.475 (West 2006).
77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2501(e) (Supp. 2000); Sovern, supra note 47, at 1317.
78. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 47, at 1312–13.
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Boucher and Cliff Stearns, members of the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet,
introduced a draft bill that proposed new Internet privacy regulations.79
The unnamed bill was met with criticism from both Democrats and
Republicans in Congress.
The proposed bill expanded the definition of sensitive information
to include an individual’s Internet Protocol (I.P.) address, name, race or
ethnicity, precise location, or any user-entered preference profile.80
Hence, if any of this personal information could be used to identify a
user, companies would be required to provide users with notice.81 The
proposal would require companies to include descriptions of how the
information is collected, stored, and the duration of the data storage.82
The issues of consent and opt-out were heavily disputed in the
2010 draft bill. Under the proposal, an individual is deemed to have
consented to the collection of data by either affirmatively granting
consent or failing to decline consent at the time a clear statement is
conveyed to the individual.83 Thus, the proposal allowed for implied
consent. Privacy advocates like Jeffrey Chester, the Director for the
Center for Digital Democracy, were disappointed that the proposal
relied upon consent.84 Chester said, “The flaw is that it forces consumers
to rely on digital fine print. It’s still buried in the privacy policies.”85
While this requirement applied to marketers and advertisers, the
bill made exceptions for entities that delete information within eighteen
months.86 Nevertheless, advertisers and marketers found the notice
requirement too restrictive.87 They argued that behavior advertising
allows everyone to benefit from free Internet service.88 If consent
notices were required, then costs would be imposed upon Internet

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Discussion Draft, supra note 21.
Id. §§ 2(5), 2(6), 2(8)–2(11).
Id. § 3(a).
Id. § 3(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 3(a)(3)(A)(ii).
See Stephanie Clifford, Privacy Bill Finally in Draft, as Both Sides Weigh In, MEDIA
DECODER
BLOG
(May
4,
2010,
2:14
PM),
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/privacy-bill-finally-in-draft-as-both-sidesweigh-in/.
85. Id.
86. Discussion Draft, supra note 21, § 3(e)(2).
87. Clifford, supra note 84.
88. Letter from Daniel Castro, Senior Analyst, The Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation, to Rick Boucher, Congressman, and, Cliff Stearns, Congressman, Subcomm. on
Commc’ns, Tech. & the Internet, (May 25, 2010) [hereinafter ITIF Letter], available at
http://www.itif.org/files/2010-privacy-legislation-comments.pdf.
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service providers who would in turn pass this cost on to the consumer.89
However, in a New York Times interview, Congressman Boucher
disagreed with the assessment that this proposed provision would hinder
businesses. He instead noted: “Our goal is to enhance electronic
commerce - we are not seeking in any way to disable targeted
advertising.”90
The proposed bill would delegate more authority to the FTC to
implement and enforce informational privacy rights. The Commission
would be responsible for the enforcement of the act91 and it would have
the authority to amend or enact regulations to carry out the act.92
Alternatively, because the proposed bill does not allow for a private
right of action, the state attorney general could bring a claim on behalf
of a citizen of the state.93 The Commission would still retain the
authority to intervene, however.94 Moreover, if the FTC pursued a civil
action against a defendant, the state attorney general would be
prohibited from bringing a lawsuit.95
The proposed Internet privacy bill also preempted state privacy
laws.96 This provision was met with approval by the Information
Technology & Innovative Foundation (ITIF), a non-partisan public
policy think tank committed to advancing a pro-technology public
policy agenda.97 In a letter to the Congressmen Boucher and Stearns,
ITIF noted that a federal framework that established a single standard of
law would make it easier for the private sector to meet compliance.98
As Congress opened its 112th session in 2011, the issue of Internet
privacy was gaining traction. This was due in part to President Obama’s
November 2010 announcement that he planned to appoint a “privacy
czar” to oversee the implementation of new privacy laws.99 The Obama
administration took a more hands-on approach to Internet regulations
compared to previous administrations because of the central role of
personal information.100 Moreover, new congressional representatives,
89. Id.
90. Clifford, supra note 84.
91. Discussion Draft, supra note 21, § 8(a).
92. Id.
93. Id. § 8(b).
94. Id. § 8(b)(2).
95. Id. § 8(b)(2)(B).
96. Id. § 10.
97. ITIF Letter, supra note 88, at 2.
98. See generally id.
99. Julia Angwin, Watchdog Planned for Online Privacy, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703848204575608970171176014.html.
100. Id.

278

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 34:267

who were likely to have a strong influence on Internet and data
collection legislation, also expressed interest in the issue. In February
2011, Jackie Speier, a congresswoman from California, introduced the
“Do Not Track Me Online Act.”101 This bill would give the FTC the
powers to create a national opt-out option for Internet users and to
impose financial penalties for violations of the act.102 This “Do Not
Track” mechanism is similar to one suggested by the FTC, which noted
in December 2010:
One way to facilitate consumer choice is to provide it in a uniform
and comprehensive way . . . The most practical method of providing
such universal choice would likely involve the placement of a
persistent setting, similar to a cookie, on the consumer’s browser
signaling the consumer’s choices about being tracked and receiving
targeted ads. Commission staff supports this approach, sometimes
103
referred to as a ‘Do Not Track.’

Thus, with such an emphasis on privacy issues, the 2010 draft bill was
likely to be rewritten by the 112th Congress.
Furthermore, any revisions of the 2010 draft bill would likely
take into account a December 2010 report dealing with online privacy
written by the Department of Commerce Internet policy task force.104
After a year-long review, the eighty-eight page report called for Internet
businesses to develop a bill of rights to protect consumer data privacy.105
The report also called for the Obama administration to form a new
government office to oversee these privacy efforts.106 The Commerce
Department, however, did not call for comprehensive privacy
legislation. Rather, the report suggested that companies voluntarily
101. See generally Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter
H.R. 654], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr654ih/pdf/BILLS112hr654ih.pdf.
102. See H.R. 654 §§ 3, 5.
103. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: PROTECTING CONSUMER
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE - A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND
POLICYMAKERS vi–vii (2010) [hereinafter FTC PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.
104. See generally Commercial Data Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy: A
Dynamic
Policy
Framework,
U.S.
DEPARTMENT
COM.
(Dec.
16,
2010)
http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2010/december/iptf-privacy-greenpaper.pdf [hereinafter Commercial Data Privacy] (for the full report).
105. Commerce Department Unveils Policy Framework for Protecting Consumer Privacy
Online While Supporting Innovation, U.S. DEPARTMENT COM. (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2010/12/16/commerce-department-unveilspolicy-framework-protecting-consumer-priv [hereinafter Consumer Privacy Press Release].
106. See Commercial Data Privacy, supra note 104, at 44; see also Consumer Privacy Press
Release, supra note 105.
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agree to comply with principles that protect consumer information.107
Companies that complied with the voluntary code of conduct could
receive safe harbor protection.108 Thus, the safe harbor would create
broad protection for entities that demonstrated compliance with the code
by providing those entities with certain immunities.109 Nonetheless,
Secretary of Commerce Locke conceded that stronger enforcement is
necessary for this self-regulation to work.110
In 1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
outlined a Code of Fair Information Practices (FIPPs)111 that would
create “safeguard requirements” for certain “automated personal data
systems” maintained by the Federal Government.112 The Commerce
Department suggested that adoption of baseline FIPPs, akin to a
“Privacy Bill of Rights,” would outline “a clear set of principles” that
could guide “how companies collect and use personal information for
commercial purposes.”113 The task force concluded that the proposed
bill of rights would close gaps in the current policy, provide greater
transparency, and increase certainty for businesses to reach
compliance.114 The Commerce Department noted that an important
concern of any regulation is its impact on the business sector.115 In fact,
the FIPPs were designed to encourage innovation by businesses—a key
factor in whether any privacy bill received Republican support.116 Thus,
it was not surprising when Senators John McCain and John Kerry
introduced yet another privacy bill that placed a three million dollar
penalty cap for privacy violations.117
Nevertheless, privacy advocacy groups argued that this
accommodation of the business sector was not enough to protect
Internet users and, moreover, was likely to only result in maintenance of
the status quo. Jeff Chester, founder of the Center for Digital
107. See Commercial Data Privacy, supra note 104, at 41.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 44.
110. Jim Puzzanghera, U.S. Proposes Online Privacy Bill of Rights, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16,
2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/16/business/la-fi-obama-privacy-20101217.
111. Commonly referred to as Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs).
112. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
§ 4 (1973), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm; see
also Commercial Data Privacy, supra note 104, at 11.
113. Consumer Privacy Press Release, supra note 105; see Commercial Data Privacy, supra
note 104, at vii, 3–5, 11, 23–24, 70; Puzzanghera, supra note 110.
114. Commercial Data Privacy, supra note 104, at vii.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011) § 404(c).
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Democracy, noted that the proposed “framework is based on industry
self-regulation.”118 Privacy advocates, however, desire stronger
government regulation. As Susan Grant, director of consumer protection
for the Consumer Federation of America said: “It’s good that the
Department of Commerce recognized we have a privacy problem, but
the solution isn’t more self-regulation. We’ve tried that and it’s clearly
inadequate. We need a privacy law that sets the rules of the road.”119
III. BACKGROUND OF E.U. LAW
In contrast to the United States, privacy law in Europe has
developed as a personal dignity rather than a liberty.120 The notion of
privacy as a dignity is suggested by Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which protects the “right to respect for
private and family life.”121 Furthermore, the European Union’s new
Charter of Fundamental Rights protects both “respect for private and
family life” and “protection of personal data.”122 In another example of
the importance Europeans place upon informational privacy, the
German state of Hesse drafted the world’s first data-protection law in
1970.123 These examples illustrate that the European Union has taken a
more regulatory role in informational privacy than the United States.124
A. European Union: Umbrella Legislative Model That Provides a
Uniform Approach to Data Collection Privacy Laws
Europe has achieved legal uniformity for data collection through
its directives.125 European Union directives are legislative acts that
require member states to achieve a desired result.126 In turn, member

118. Angwin, supra note 99; see also Puzzanghera, supra note 110.
119. Puzzanghera, supra note 110.
120. See generally Whitman, supra note 37 (discussing different notions of privacy across
European and American society).
121. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 8, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230.
122. Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, 2000 O.J.
(C 364) 10.
123. Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz [HDSG] [Hessian Data Protection Act], Hess GVBl. I.
625 (1970).
124. See also Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the EU
and Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground, 2 UNIV. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 361 (2005),
available
at
www.uoltj.ca/articles/vol2.2/2005.2.2.uoltj.Levin.357-395.pdf
(comparing
restrictions placed by the US and EU governments on private sector use of personal information).
125. Id.
126. Application
of
EU
Law,
EUR.
COMMISSION
(June
11,
2012),
http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/directives/directives_en.htm.
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states must then adopt legislation that complies with the directives.127
The Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC gave member states until 1998
to implement data collection legislation. The directive broadly defined
personal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person . . . who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity.”128 Member states were required to create a supervisory
authority to monitor the state’s compliance with the directive.129 The
supervisory authority has investigative powers as well as the power to
engage in legal proceedings.130 The directive also allows for individuals
to object to the processing of personal data for direct marketing
purposes.131 Additionally, individual citizens can bring complaints of
violations to the supervisory authority or the court, and are entitled to
relief as a result of the unlawful processing of their personal data.132
B. United Kingdom: Europe’s Least Stringent Data Collection Laws
In 1998, the United Kingdom passed the Data Protection Act,
which met the requirements of the EU directive.133 Although the UK
laws met the requirements at the time of promulgation, UK data
collection legislation is among Europe’s most relaxed. Consent, for
example, is often deemed implied for non-sensitive data.134 Consent for
sensitive data can take many forms, including written, oral, or by the
clicking of a box.135 This is in contrast to Germany’s laws, which call
for consent to be in writing.136
In 2009, it was reported that the United Kingdom failed to properly
implement eleven of the directive’s thirty-four articles, or nearly a third
of the directive.137 Later that year the EU Telecoms Commission opened
127. Id.
128. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 32, art. 2.
129. Id. art. 17.
130. Id. art. 28.
131. Id. art. 14.
132. Id. art. 22.
133. Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.).
134. Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy Challenges, in Particular
in the Light of Technological Developments: Final Report, at 31 (Jan. 20, 2010) [hereinafter
Commission
Comparative
Study
Final
Report],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_en.
pdf.
135. A.6—United Kingdom, supra note 34, at 29.
136. A.4—Germany, supra note 33, at 17.
137. A.6—United Kingdom, supra note 34, at 1.
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an infringement proceeding against the United Kingdom.138 The
Commission found that behavioral advertising, which monitors users’
Internet interests and then delivers targeted advertisements, was not
properly regulated.139 In that instance, users were not properly informed
of the data collection.140 Furthermore, the Telecoms Commission found
that the United Kingdom lacked an independent national supervisory
authority to oversee regulations.141 This incident highlighted aspects of
the disharmony within the European Union: namely, compliance and
enforcement of the directive by the member states.142
A European Commission report highlighted the narrow approach
that the United Kingdom has taken with regard to personal data.143 The
Court of Appeal case Durant v. Financial Services Authority narrowed
the definition of what constitutes personal data.144 There, the court found
that personal data did not extend to information focusing on things other
than the individual.145 Additionally, the United Kingdom made nuanced
distinctions of when IP addresses constitute personal data. Rather than
provide a bright-line rule, UK authorities have defined IP addresses as
either “dynamic” or “static.”146 Static IP addresses are classified as
personal data because they retain information regarding a particular
individual.147 On the other hand, dynamic IP addresses contain
information regarding a particular computer but are not linked to an
individual user. Consequently, dynamic IP addresses do not fall within
the definition of personal data.148 The EU report found that the UK
approach deviates from that of other EU countries.149
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) carries out
enforcement of data protection in the United Kingdom.150 The UK
government sponsors the ICO, raising doubts about whether this
structure complies with the directive statute that ensures that the
138. Press Release, European Union, Telecoms: Commission Launches Case Against UK
Over Privacy and Personal Data Protection (Apr. 14, 2009), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/570&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See Commission Comparative Study Final Report, supra note 134, ¶ 17.
143. A.6—United Kingdom, supra note 34, at 1.
144. Durant v. Financial Services Authority, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1746, ¶ 28 (Eng.).
145. Id.; see A.6—United Kingdom, supra note 34, at 5.
146. A.6—United Kingdom, supra note 34, at 6.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 59.
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supervisory authority acts with complete independence.151 The ICO
commissioner lacks the power that other European states give to the
supervisory authority. For instance, the ICO commissioner does not
have autonomous power to demand access to data.152 Rather, the
commissioner must first apply for a search warrant from a judge.153 In
2006, the ICO applied for only seven such warrants.154
Recently, however, the ICO commissioner has been granted more
powers.155 The commissioner can now impose a monetary penalty.156
Further, the ICO can now audit an organization’s data processing
practices without the organization’s consent.157 Despite these new
powers, the EU report expressed doubts that these measures would lead
to stronger enforcement, in part, because the ICO has been reluctant to
exercise its already-existing power.158 The report pointed specifically to
the fact that the ICO generally investigates instances that are first
exposed by the media.159 Moreover, most of the cases that had been
brought to the attention of the ICO were simply dealt with by giving
advice and guidance.160 Thus, the EU report concluded, these additional
powers would likely only be exercised in the most egregious and easiest
to prove data security breaches.161
C. Germany: Europe’s Strictest Data Collection Laws
Data collection regulations in Germany have a strong
constitutional basis.162 After the region of Hesse adopted the world’s
first data protection law in 1970, the first German federal law was
passed seven years later. The subsequent development of these laws was
reflected in the 1983 German Constitutional Court’s finding of a
fundamental right to “informational self-determination” in the German
constitution.163 Consequently, under the German constitution, an
individual has the right to determine for himself the disclosure or use of

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
A.6—United Kingdom, supra note 34, at 60.
Id.
Id.
Criminal Justice and Information Act, 2008, c. 4, § 144.
Id.
A.6—United Kingdom, supra note 34, at 61.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73.
A.4—Germany, supra note 33, at 1.
Id. at 2.
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his personal information.164 Germany has continued to adopt strong
privacy laws that protect the collection of informational data.165 Most
scholars agree that the German stance on privacy is the result of the
country’s history of Nazism.166 Today, there are sixteen general data
protection laws in Germany and many other laws dealing with data
protection in specific contexts or that otherwise bear on data
protection.167 Thus, the result is a collection of data protection laws that

is both detailed and technical.

The German high court expressed its wariness of overreaching EU
law when it approved the Treaty of Lisbon. There, the Constitutional
Court stated in its June 2009 decision:
If legal protection cannot be obtained at the Union level, the Federal
Constitutional Court examines whether legal instruments of the
European institutions and bodies keep within the boundaries of the
sovereign powers accorded to them by way of conferral . . . [T]he
fundamental political and constitutional structures of sovereign
168
Member States . . . cannot be safeguarded in any other way.

Hence, the German Constitutional Court has retained the ultimate right
169
to test the validity of European law under the German Constitution.
The issue of data collection is an area where the question of supremacy
of constitutional or European law is likely to be raised. Because of the
German Constitutional Court’s previous rulings, such a situation would
result in the Court regarding any European rules that fall short of the
Court’s standards as “invalid and unenforceable.”170
In Germany, data protection often rests on complex “balance”
provisions.171 The EC report noted, however, that this test is too
172
vague.
In several circumstances within the private sector, data
173
processing for secondary purposes is allowed without consent.
In
174
these contexts, a balancing test is used that favors the private sector.

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Whitman, supra note 37, at 1180.
167. A.4—Germany, supra note 33, at 3.
168. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 30, 2009,
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE], ¶ 240 (Ger.).
169. A.4—Germany, supra note 33, at 1.
170. Id.
171. See Federal Data Protection Act, supra note 3, §§ 28(1), 29(1), 30(2).
172. A.4—Germany, supra note 33, at 12.
173. See id. at 20 (processing of personal data in the private sector on the basis of statutory
authorization).
174. Id.
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This test, however, is also employed for the public sector.
It is
necessary to note that the EU Data Protection Directive allows for
processing when it is “necessary for the performance of a task carried
out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority.”176
Germany, however, has included stricter protection than the directive
requires by implementing provisions that limit data collected
specifically by the body carrying out the task.177 When the balance test
is employed in these instances, the balance is “tilted against the public
178
sector.”
Nevertheless, the enforcement system in Germany is not as strong
as might be expected. In the public sector, the role of the federal and
state data protection commissioners is limited.179 For example, the
federal commissioner can demand a formal review but cannot order
specific changes.180 Thus, the commissioner’s role is not one of
significant legal power. Conversely, in the private sector, supervisory
authorities are granted extensive powers of investigation and
181
enforcement. The supervisory authority can demand “any information
which the supervisory authority needs for the fulfillment of its task,”182
183
and the information must be provided without delay. Moreover, the
authority can carry out inspections of documents and personal data
files.184 With regard to enforcement, the supervisory authority can set a
deadline for the compliance of certain measures and impose
185
administrative fines.
In 2009, Germany enacted additional amendments to the Federal
Data Protection Act. These amendments required notification of data
186
security breaches and strengthened regulation of data marketers.
Additionally, the amendments increased fines from €25,000 to €50,000
for violations of the law.187 These changes also strengthened the power
of the data protection authorities. For example, when a data controller
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
38.
182.
183.
184.
185.
38(5).
186.
187.

Id. at 19.
Council Directive 95/46, supra note 32, art. 7(e).
See Federal Data Protection Act, supra note 3, § 13.
A.4—Germany, supra note 33, at 19.
Id. at 52.
Id.; see Federal Data Protection Act, supra note 3, § 25.
A.4—Germany, supra note 33, at 52; see Federal Data Protection Act, supra note 3, §
A.4—Germany, supra note 33, at 52.
Federal Data Protection Act, supra note 3, § 38.
Id. §§ 24, 38(4).
A.4—Germany, supra note 33, at 53; see Federal Data Protection Act, supra note 3, §
Federal Data Protection Act, supra note 3, § 33.
Id. § 43(3).
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notifies the supervisory authority about a breach, an investigation will
be launched followed by stiffer fines.188
Nonetheless, it is necessary to consider the context of a modern
technological society in which EU data collection laws operate.
Germany, for instance, had a population of over 81 million in 2010.189
All versions of the iPhone sold out within days.190 There were an
estimated 7.7 million German Facebook users as of May 2010.191
Although Germany was the only country to offer an opt-out option for
Google’s Street View service before its launch, only an estimated
250,000 people, or three percent of the population, exercised this
option.192 In fact, some Germans embraced the Street View mapping,
with the mayor and tourist board of Oberstaufen, Germany inviting
Google to put their town on the map and even baking a cake for the
occasion.193
The United Kingdom, with less stringent data collection laws, has
experienced much of the same consumer behavior. As of March 2011,
for instance, there were 30 million Facebook users in the United
Kingdom, which has a population of about 63 million.194 Thus,
consumer behavior in both the United Kingdom and Germany illustrate
a growing disconnect with Germany’s strict data collection laws.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. AND E.U. DATA COLLECTION
PRIVACY LAWS
A. The Proposed United States Internet Bill is the Functional
Equivalent of an EU Directive, But Would Eliminate the Disharmony
Within EU Laws
By analyzing the EU approach to data collection privacy laws, the
United States can gain valuable insight. The EU’s blanket legislation
provides member states with uniform standards. This system is not
infallible, however. In fact, there is much disharmony of data protection
188. Id. §§ 42a, 43.
189. The
World
Factbook:
Germany,
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html (last visited Aug. 10,
2012).
190. O’Brien, supra note 8.
191. Id.
192. German Street View Goes Live with Enhanced Privacy, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11673117.
193. Id.
194. Daily Mail Reporter, Network Nation: Facebook Users in the UK Surges to Half of the
Population, DAILY MAIL (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article1362413/Facebook-users-UK-surges-HALF-population.html#.
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laws within the EU. Thus, the United States should be mindful of the
strengths and limitations of the E.U. system when adopting new data
collection privacy laws.
The proposed May 2010 U.S. Internet privacy bill provides a
blanket federal law that serves as the functional equivalent of an E.U.
directive.195 Thus, the promulgation of a federal law would provide
states with a uniform standard. While the EU has implemented uniform
standards, there has been disharmony with the variation and
enforcement of these standards. It should be noted, however, that the
proposed U.S. bill includes a preemption clause, allowing the law to
supersede conflicting state regulations. This move toward national
uniformity could avoid the disharmony the EU experiences with
regulation and enforcement of data protection laws.196
1. Disharmony Within EU Law: Variations of Standards
Although EU Member States enact legislation with similar
wording, application of these laws varies significantly, often resulting in
disharmony.197 This is in part because countries apply different tests,
ranging from “reasonable expectations,” “fairness,” or even “balancing”
tests.198 Another divergence occurs when countries delineate exceptions
for the public sector. UK law, for instance, makes exceptions for
broadly defined “policing purposes.”199 On the other hand, Germany
provides exceptions for more tailored instances that include “countering
immediate threats,” “general and specific prevention,” and
“investigation and prosecution of [suspected] criminal offences.”200
Moreover, these differences are further exacerbated when the
adjudication of multi-national issues is necessary.201
2. Disharmony Within EU Law: Enforcement of Standards
One shortcoming of EU law was addressed in a March 2010
opinion paper that examined the principle of accountability and
enforcement of data collection rights in Europe.202 The Article 29
195. Discussion Draft, supra note 21.
196. Id. § 10.
197. Commission Comparative Study Final Report, supra note 134, ¶ 50.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Opinion 3/2010 on the Principle of Accountability, Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party,
00062/10/EN
WP
173
(July
13,
2010),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp173_en.pdf.
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Working Party that was responsible for this opinion was concerned
about whether the implementation of data protection requirements
resulted in effective mechanisms, and, in turn, delivered real protection
to Internet users.203 As the opinion paper noted, the Article 29 Working
Party wanted to move from “theory to practice.”204 With this in mind,
the paper advanced a proposal for accountability that would require data
controllers to put in place appropriate and effective measures to ensure
compliance with the principles and obligations set forth in the directive
and to further demonstrate such compliance to the member state’s
supervisory authorities.205
While the new proposal does not introduce any requirements that
do not already exist under current law, it does set forth provisions that
ensure compliance. For instance, Directive 2002/58 was amended in
2009 and called for “the implementation of a security policy with
respect to the processing of personal data.”206 The Working Party report
is evidence of the need for clear legal standards ensuring Member States
meet both the standards and implementation requirements of the data
protection directives.207
3. The Need for a Preemption Clause
The disharmony within the EU is an excellent example of the need
for clear, cohesive laws. A blanket federal law in the United States
would create a clear standard with which states can comply. With the
inclusion of a preemption clause, this umbrella legislation could help
the United States avoid some of the disharmony EU countries face.
Such a clause would preempt state privacy laws. Although some states
have given citizens more privacy rights through legislation, these laws
have been narrowly tailored to combat a single problem like spam email messages or telemarketers.208 Thus, states have not provided
comprehensive data protection legislation. Nevertheless, a blanket data
collection law with a preemption clause would provide a clear standard
for all fifty states.
The Commerce Department’s 2010 report called for a narrowly
tailored preemption clause.209 Citing concerns of businesses, the report
203. Id. ¶ 1.
204. Id.
205. Id. ¶ 74.
206. Id. ¶ 37.
207. Id. ¶ 74.
208. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.190.030 (regarding unpermitted or misleading
electronic email).
209. Commercial Data Privacy, supra note 104, at 62.

2011]

Data Collection Laws

289

suggested that states could provide remedies more quickly and take into
consideration developing technologies when enacting legislation.210 One
proposal was to limit preemption to state laws that addressed the same
subject matter.211 Another suggestion called for the state attorneys
general to enforce federal law while preserving state laws.212
Compliance is only one aspect of the problems the EU faces.
Enforcement of data protection laws has proven to be another
challenge.213 Under the current U.S. system, the FTC holds regulatory
power but only regulates for “unfairness” and “deception” practices.214
Thus, any effective data collection legislation will require a regulating
authority with more power. This could be accomplished by either
granting the FTC more regulatory authority or by creating a separate
commission with more authority. It should be noted that all the recent
legislative bills that have been introduced have proposed granting the
FTC more regulatory authority.215
In its task force report, the Commerce Department suggested that
the FTC remain the primary enforcement agency.216 The report called
for the creation of an authority to convene business and civil society
groups to develop effective, consensus-based voluntary codes.217 The
proposed authority, called the Privacy Policy Office (PPO), would work
alongside the FTC, but it would have no enforcement authority of its
own.218 Instead, the PPO would serve as a center of commercial data
privacy policy expertise.219 The office would also help foster policy that
takes into consideration the potential effects on both businesses and
consumers. For instance, the PPO would suggest where new industry
privacy codes are needed based on consumer complaints, research, and
industry initiatives.220 The creation of the PPO demonstrates the
Commerce Department’s recognition of the need for stronger
210. Id. at 61.
211. Id. at 62.
212. Id.
213. See Francesca Bignami, Privacy and Law Enforcement in the European Union: The
Data Retention Directive, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 233, 234–35 (2007).
214. Chris Hoofnagle, Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New Privacy
Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments: B.1—United States of
America,
EUR.
COMM’N
18–19
(May
2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_privacy_challenges/final_report_cou
ntry_report_B1_usa.pdf [hereinafter B.1—United States of America].
215. See, e.g., Discussion Draft, supra note 21, § 8(b)(2); H.R. 654, supra note 102, §4.
216. Commercial Data Privacy, supra note 104, at 51.
217. Id. at 44.
218. Id. at 45–46.
219. Id. at 45.
220. Id. at 48.
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regulations. It further illustrates that privacy policies must be enforced
by a single, powerful entity if effective data collection laws are to be
accomplished.
B. Effective Legislation: The Delineation
of Consistent Consent and Opt-Out Policies
For the successful implementation of effective data protection
legislation, the United States will have to delineate consistent consent
and opt-out policies. The varying levels of consent within the United
States’ current laws demonstrate the uneven landscape of data
protection.221 In fact, an EU study noted that inconsistent levels of
consent in U.S. law resulted in large gaps within privacy laws.222 This
problem is not exclusive to the United States, however. The EU has also
encountered similar problems. This is exemplified by the disparity
between laws in the UK and Germany. For example, consent is often
deemed implied in the UK.223 Germany, however, stipulates that consent
is “only valid if it is based on the free decision of the person
concerned.”224 Thus, to create cohesive legislation, the United States
will have to adopt clearly defined policies.
Any proposal of new data collection laws will surely meet
resistance from the business sector. In January 2011, it was reported that
Facebook changed its lobbying status in Washington, D.C. because
stronger privacy legislation was being debated.225 Current laws allow
businesses to use personal information without consent and without
giving individuals the opportunity to opt-out.226 Furthermore, companies
are allowed to vaguely state their privacy policies.227 These practices
have occurred largely because the business sector is allowed substantial
latitude. As the Commerce Department’s report cites, the commercial
221. See, e.g., id. at 2 (majority consensus that there is a need for a “baseline commercial data
privacy framework”).
222. See, e.g., B.1—United States of America, supra note 214, at 4 (noting that in the
surveillance context, federal law requires “one-party consent” while states follow an “all-party
consent” model for recording conversations).
223. Press Release, European Union, Telecom: Commission Launches Case Against UK over
Privacy
and
Personal
Data
Protection
(Apr.
14,
2009)
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/570&format=HTML&aged=0&la
nguage=EN&guiLanguage=en.
224. A.4—Germany, supra note 33, at 7.
225. Jon Swartz, Facebook Changes Its Lobbying Status in Washington, USA TODAY (Jan.
12,
2011),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2011-01-13facebook13_CV_N.htm.
226. See B.1—United States of America, supra note 214, at 41.
227. Id. at 28.
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sector is given deference because the government does not want to stifle
innovation.228 Thus, with such an emphasis placed on economic
considerations, the United States may not be able to adopt EU-like data
protection laws.229
C. Effective Legislation: The Implementation
of Remedial Measures for Individuals
The proposed U.S. bill does not provide a right of action for
individuals.230 Although this approach is similar to that of the EU, a
recent EU report called for improving this provision. In the report, the
Commission advocated for individual rights and remedies that were
effective, speedy, and cheap.231 The report further noted the need for
specific remedial rights to be outlined in any upcoming amendments.232
To improve the situation in the EU, the report also called for nongovernmental and civil groups to be granted standing so they can bring
actions on behalf of individuals.233 Moreover, the report noted that class
action lawsuits in the United States should serve as a model for how the
EU legal system could better provide individuals with remedies for their
grievances.234
Finally, another issue addressed by the Commission was damages.
The Commission urged liquidated damages to be higher than the cost of
non-compliance.235 This would incentivize entities to comply with the
directions in the law. These recommendations underscore the
shortcomings of remedies that are currently available to individuals in
the EU system. Therefore, before doing away with an individual’s
redress, U.S. legislators should consider the implications of such
measures.

228. See Commercial Data Privacy, supra note 104, at iii.
229. In January 2012, the EU Commission proposed comprehensive reform to data protection
rules that called for a Regulation to be immediately binding on Member States. Thus, the
Regulation would avoid the varying levels of interpretation of the Directive by each Member
State, which has consequently led to disharmony within the EU. See European Commission,
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Movement of Such Data, COM (2012) 11
final
(Jan.
25,
2012),
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0011:FIN:EN:PDF.
230. Discussion Draft, supra note 21, § 9.
231. Commission Comparative Study Final Report, supra note 134, ¶¶ 110–11.
232. Id.
233. Id. ¶ 111.
234. Id.
235. Id. ¶ 112.
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V. CONCLUSION
In any comparative analysis of privacy laws, it is necessary to note
that European and American notions of privacy differ. Furthermore,
while scholars have debated the origin of American notions of privacy,
such an origin is unlikely to be monocausal.236 Thus, a fierce protection
of the home, a distrust of the government, or a misunderstanding of the
commercial sector’s privacy protection practices is unlikely to be the
singular source of American notions of privacy.237
European privacy has developed as a “personal dignity,” whereas
privacy within the United States has developed as a “liberty.”238 Privacy
laws within the United States have protected individuals from intrusions
by the State and have provided protection for decisional privacy.239
Informational privacy, however, has not received such protection and is
regulated by a patchwork system of federal and state laws.240 The result
is a system that lacks consistent and cohesive standards.
An incident with the social networking site Facebook illustrates
the notion that consumers’ desire more protection for their personal
information. Facebook experienced widespread user revolt when users
became aware of the website’s new news feed, its “Beacon” service,
and changes in the terms of its service policy.241 The “Beacon” service
allowed a user’s Facebook “friends” to track the user’s “purchases on
partner websites,”242 and the “news feed” feature allowed “friends” to
track a user’s use of the website.243 The changes in the company’s terms
of service gave Facebook a “perpetual license for user-submitted
content,” even after an account was terminated.244 While these policies
were not unusual for Internet companies in the United States,245
Facebook users expressed their discomfort with the company’s
236. Kumayama, supra note 31, at 429–30.
237. See Whitman, supra note 37, at 1161 (arguing that respect and personal dignity are at the
core of U.S. notions of privacy).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1193.
241. B.1—United States of America, supra note 214, at 6.
211. Partner websites are websites chosen by Facebook, which are given user data in order to
give individuals “a more personalized experience.” See Facebook Help Center – Instant
Personalization, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=202975766411357 (last
visited Aug. 12, 2012).
243. B.1–United States of America, supra note 214, at 6.
244. Id. As of April 26, 2011, the Facebook terms state the “IP License ends when you delete
your IP content or your account unless your content has been shared with others, and they have
not deleted it.” Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (June 8, 2012),
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf.
245. Id.
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policies.246 This example suggests that “Americans would object to
many common business uses of personal information.” 247
Similarly, Apple received criticism in April 2011, when it was
reported that its iPhones and iPads recorded and collected user location
data.248 The revelation caused an outcry from users and privacy
watchdogs alike.249 Apple responded by providing a software update and
releasing a statement noting that it was not tracking the location of
users’ iPhones, but merely collecting information to improve its location
and traffic information databases.250 The episode highlighted the fact
that while users are willing to share this information as part of a service,
this information is deemed sensitive enough that users do not want the
information recorded.251 Thus, the Facebook and Apple examples
further indicate the balance that must be struck with privacy in a digital
age.
As the United States adopts new data collection laws, it may look
to the EU as a model. Although the EU provides cohesive data
collection laws, its system is not infallible. When analyzing the UK and
Germany, a disparity of standards between the countries is evident.
Germany has some of the strictest data collection laws in the world,
while the UK has some of the least stringent. Moreover, enforcement of
EU directives is, at times, uneven. Lastly, the EU system places
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location-sharing technologies all that useful, and they are concerned about their privacy when
sharing their locations online.” Tsai et al., supra at 147. However, “people still believe that the
risks of sharing their locations online outweigh the benefits.” Tsai et al., supra.
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limitations on an individual’s redress.
Thus, while the EU system provides an adoptable model, these
shortcomings should be considered when implementing new data
collection legislation in the United States. Accordingly, a successful bill
would provide the FTC with more regulatory authority. Such a bill
would also need to delineate specific consent and opt-out policies.
Finally, any new legislation should include a preemption clause
allowing for easier compliance and enforcement.
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote The Right to
Privacy, a seminal law review article that called for the creation of
privacy rights in an era marked by the invention of photography and the
rise of tabloid journalism.252 In the years that have passed, privacy has
morphed into a constitutional right—one that encompasses
contraception and abortion.253 And while privacy within a digital age
remains nuanced, there is still a role for regulation. Certainly, there are
competing factors—consumer attitudes and the commercial sector’s
concerns—that must be resolved. Data collection laws, however, can be
implemented to provide Americans with broader protection while taking
into account consumer attitudes in a modern digital age.
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253. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113
(1973).

